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CHAPTER XIV

CONCLUSION
States have not in the past been willing, and are not now prepared, to accord visiting armed forces blanket immunity from
their criminal jurisdiction, at least in time of peace, except in
special circumstances.

A

receiving state violates no rule of in-

ternational law in taking this position.

Since a state can deny to any other state the right to station
armed forces in its territory, it can couple a grant of the right
with the requirement that mutually satisfactory arrangements be

made with

respect to jurisdiction over the visiting forces.

Con-

troversy can arise, however, on the understanding to be implied

when

foreign troops are permitted to enter a state without an

agreement governing their status having been made. The
sending state is, it seems clear, entitled to enforce its law through
explicit

courts-martial sitting in the receiving state.

To

this end, the

may exercise a limited
police power over the visiting forces and may summon members
of the force as witnesses. Comparable powers may perhaps be
military authorities of the sending state

exercised over civilians accompanying the visiting force and over

dependents. The sending state has no such power with respect to
others, except perhaps in extreme cases, e.g., in a combat zone
in time of war. The receiving state has no, or at most a limited,
supervisory jurisdiction over the visiting forces. The receiving
state

may, for example, have jurisdiction

to decide

whether the

accused is in fact a member of the visiting force.
The receiving state, it seems equally clear, has concurrent jurisdiction over the visiting forces except perhaps in special circumstances. Put another way, no blanket immunity is to be implied from the grant of permission to station troops in the receiving state.

passage, or in

The immunity may exist with respect to troops in
time of war in a combat zone. The immunity ap-

pears also to be recognized with respect to the crews of warships
for acts which occur on board the warship, but not with respect
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armed forces on a base. Whether the immunity will be implied
where the act was done in the performance of duty is unsettled.
Where there is concurrent jurisdiction, international law proto

vides no rule for resolving the conflict.

That there is so much doubt in this whole area
standable. The sending state has an obvious interest
to keep complete control over its

armed forces

underin seeking
is

at all times.

The

receiving state has an equally obvious interest in claiming concurrent jurisdiction. All of the considerations which support the
territorial principle bolster the receiving state's claim. These

considerations center around two basic ideas. One is the interest
of the receiving state in protecting both the state and the lives

and residents. The other is that
justice can be administered most effectively at the place of the
crime. The weight to be given these conflicting interests can, of
course, vary with the circumstances, and the circumstances in
which armed forces are stationed abroad can and do differ over
a very wide range.
All of this explains and justifies the recent practice of allocating
jurisdiction over visiting forces by formal agreements. An agreement can both resolve the doubts which exist in the absence of
agreement, and also take into account the particular circumand property of

its

citizens

stances.

The
since

status of forces agreements which have been entered into

World War

II are illuminating

with respect to the con-

sensus of states as to the proper allocation of jurisdiction. They
suggest that in special circumstances complete immunity for the
visiting force may be appropriate. They also suggest that in
other circumstances, as where a large force is to be stationed in
a receiving state for an indefinite period, the situation is relatively stable, and a common language or cultural background
make likely much intermingling of the troops and the local population, only a limited immunity will normally be accorded the
visiting forces.

The most

interesting development reflected in the status of

forces agreements, in the light of

the subject of jurisdiction,

is

much

that has been written on

the readiness of receiving states to

accord immunity (or priority of jurisdiction in the sending state)
with respect to inter se offenses. Receiving states have also

shown a perhaps

less

marked willingness

to recognize the on-base

concept, either as alone justifying according exclusive or prior
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jurisdiction to the sending state, or at least as an added factor
supporting according such jurisdiction to the sending state over

inter se offenses committed on a base.

marked contrast

These attitudes are in

to the reluctance of receiving states to recog-

nize such jurisdiction in the sending state over duty-connected
offenses. Much of the reluctance arises from a state's interest in

from the criminal acts of the visiting forces,
even though the acts were done in performance of duty. A part
of the reluctance stems, however, from the difficulties encountered
in defining the concept, determining which acts fall within it,
and deciding who is empowered to make the decision on whether
a particular act was or was not duty-connected. Many misunderprotecting

its citizens

standings could be avoided

if

these matters could be clarified.

The large number of waivers that receiving

have granted
suggests they are prepared to yield jurisdiction to a sending state
in many cases which fall outside the inter se, on-base, and dutyconnected categories. The wide use of waivers as a substitute for
an agreed allocation of jurisdiction is undesirable, since it sometimes permits irrelevant or improper considerations to influence
the decision. Several recent agreements mark the beginning of an
effort to deal with this problem. Neither these first attempts nor
any of several alternative approaches suggest, however, that establishing

new

states

categories or guidelines for the allocation of juris-

may

be that more experience is needed
before these efforts are likely to be successful. In the meantime,
the practice initiated in Italy of exercising discretion in asking
for waivers, rather than asking waivers in all cases involving
diction will be easy.

American

troops,

is

It

a step in the right direction.

should be kept in mind always that the status of forces
problem concerns the issue of jurisdiction, not that of the guilt or
innocence of the accused. All the evidence shows that visiting
forces are characteristically treated as fairly and at least as
leniently when they are tried in a civil court of an ally as
when they are tried by their own courts-martial. Moreover, relations among the nations of the Free World are a crucial factor
in the cold war which makes it necessary that troops be stationed
It

—

—

abroad.

Insisting that the

members

of these forces can be tried

only by courts-martial of the sending states, if the insistence is
based on any ground other than demonstrable military exigency,

can trouble those relations.
case after case in which a

Also,

member

making a major incident
of a visiting force

is

of

held for
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a receiving state's court is destructive of discipline. The
threat of nuclear war requires a higher rather than lower level
of discipline in the Free World's armed forces. Obviously, the
ultimate solution to many of the status of forces problems would
be the attainment of a standard of discipline which reduces to
an absolute minimum the cases in which a member of an armed
force violates the law of any state. In the meantime, it is suggested that two lines of approach will be most helpful. One is to
try to identify additional classes of cases which both sending and
receiving states may be prepared to agree should come under the
exclusive or primary jurisdiction of one or the other. The second
is to improve the administrative and enforcement provisions of
status of forces agreements. Much can be done in this area to
eliminate friction without the sacrifice of any significant interest
of any state.
trial in

